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We examine how an executive's consultations with interest groups during the formative stage of 
the policy process affect its bargaining success during the decision-making stage after it has 
proposed new policies to legislative actors. Our theory sets out how consultations with interest 
groups strengthen the executive by bolstering its formal and informal agenda-setting power. The 
empirical testing ground for our theory is the European Union (EU), and in particular the 
consultations held by the European Commission. The analysis assesses the effects of these 
consultations on the congruence between the Commission's legislative proposals on controversial 
issues and EU laws. Our analysis incorporates detailed information on the type and scope of each 
consultation. In line with our theory, we find that the Commission had more success during the 
decision-making stage after conducting open consultations with large numbers of interest groups 
during the policy formation stage.   
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Introduction 
This study examines the effect of H[HFXWLYHV¶ consultations with interest groups on the 
FRQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQWKRVHH[HFXWLYHV¶SROLF\SURSRVDOVDQG subsequent legislative outputs. The 
theoretical importance of this topic is that it refers to one of the sources of H[HFXWLYHV¶LQIOXHQFH
in legislative policymaking. For over a century, political scientists have recognized that interest 
groups play a prominent role in policymaking (Bentley 1908 [2008]; Truman 1951; Mackenzie 
1955; Richardson ed. 1982; 2012), Policymakers in national and international political systems 
regularly consult affected stakeholders before formulating policy proposals (Rokkan 1966; 
Knoke et al. 1996; Tallberg 2012; Coen and Richardson eds. 2009). Much existing research on 
interest groups provides valuable insights into the types of groups that exert influence, what their 
policy demands are, and the extent to which they influence policies. Our focus is distinct in that 
we examine how consultations with interest groups affect the bargaining success of the 
policymakers that engineer those consultations. 
We argue that executives consult interest groups partly to improve their own bargaining 
success relative to legislative actors during subsequent policy negotiations with legislatures. Two 
mechanisms put executives in a strong position in relation to legislators when they consult before 
introducing proposals. The first refers to formal agenda-setting power (Romer and Rosenthal 
1978; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). To use their formal agenda-setting power effectively, 
executives must have accurate and comprehensive information on the preferences of legislators, 
and executives can gather such information during consultations with affected interests. The 
second mechanism refers to executives¶ informal bargaining power. This includes their ability to 
persuade legislators, to which Kingdon refers as their ³FODLP WRDKHDULQJ´ -1). The 
argument here is that after consulting interest groups, executives can claim more legitimacy and 
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technical expertise than they otherwise could (Mörth 2009). We develop and test these 
arguments in the context of policymaking in the European Union, specifically consultations held 
E\ WKH(8¶VPDLQ H[HFXWLYH LQ OHJLVODWLYHGHFLVLRQ-making, the European Commission. Before 
doing so, the next section sets out our main theoretical argument. 
 
How consultations with interest groups empower executives 
Executives formulate legislative proposals that are then considered for adoption by legislative 
DFWRUV([HFXWLYHV¶policy preferences often differ from those of legislative actors. This is true in 
presidential systems where executives and legislators are elected separately (Linz 1990). It is 
also true in fused systems in which the executive is installed by the legislature after legislative 
elections (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Executives are at the apex of bureaucracies, which have 
their own goals, such as enhancing bureaucratic autonomy and preserving existing policy 
routines (Carpenter 2001), and this also characterizes the political system of the EU (Ellinas and 
Suleiman 2012).  For the purposes of our inquiry, what matters is that the policy preferences of 
executives and legislators often differ (not necessarily that they are at odds), and that executives 
seek to ensure that legislative outputs reflect their policy preferences.  
Theories of agenda setting distinguish between formal and informal agenda-setting power 
(Pollack 1997: 121; Moravcsik 1999). An agenda setter that consults can use both types of 
agenda power more effectively. The formal agenda-setting power of the executive consists of its 
right to initiate proposals. Formal models of legislative procedures focus specifically on the 
DJHQGDVHWWHU¶VIRUPDODJHQGD-setting power and how this power is constrained by the procedural 
rules that apply during the decision-making stage (e.g. Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Tsebelis and 
Garrett 2000). A key assumption of such models is that the agenda setter uses its knowledge of 
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OHJLVODWRUV¶SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHV when crafting its policy proposals. The agenda setter chooses a 
policy alternative that is as close as possible to its own policy preference, while receiving enough 
support from the legislative actors to pass. To achieve this, the agenda setter needs detailed and 
accurate information on the policy preferences of those legislators. Holding consultations with 
relevant stakeholders is one way of gathering this information, certainly if legislators are 
influenced by the same groups that participate in consultations.  
Informal agenda-VHWWLQJ SRZHU UHIHUV WR DQ DJHQGD VHWWHU¶V DELOLW\ WR DFW DV D ³SROLF\
HQWUHSUHQHXU´ VR DV ³WR VHW WKH VXEVWDQWLYH DJHQGD RI DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ QRW WKURXJK LWV IRUPDO
powers but through its ability to define issues and present proposals that can rally consensus 
DPRQJ WKH ILQDO GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV´ 3ROODFN   The idea of policy entrepreneurship is 
linked to a broader range of sources of power that are relevant beyond formal settings. A 
successful policy entrepreneur is an actor with  D ³FODLP WR D KHDULQJ´ UHVXOWLQJ IURP LWV
expert knowledge and the ability to speak on behalf of powerful interest organizations; (2) an 
ability to negotiate skillfully; and (3) persistence in pursuing policy change and persuading other 
policy actors (Kingdon 1984: 180-1). With respect to the assembly of relevant expertise, 
consultations can be viewed as large-scale brainstorming exercLVHV WKDW LQFUHDVHSROLF\PDNHUV¶
analytical capacity and ability to tackle policy problems, which represents a key aspect of 
administrative power (Heclo 1974: 305). In contrast to formal agenda-setting power, informal 
agenda-setting power relates to effectiveness in informal negotiation processes (Hunold 2001).  
These arguments in relation to formal and informal agenda-setting power have distinct 
observable implications. The argument in relation to formal agenda-setting power was that 
consultations give the executive additional information on the preferences of the legislative 
actors, which allow it to more accurately take these into account when formulating its legislative 
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proposals. If this were the case, we would expect to observe a difference between legislative 
proposals on which the executive consulted and those on which it did not consult in terms of the 
agreement between those proposals and OHJLVODWLYH DFWRUV¶ SROLF\ SUHIHUHQFHV Specifically, if 
FRQVXOWDWLRQVLPSURYHWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVVE\LQFUHDVLQJLWVIRUPDODJHQGD-setting 
power, we would expect to find the following: 
H17KHH[HFXWLYH¶VSROLF\SURSRVDOVKDYHPRUHHffective support from legislative actors when it 
previously consulted with relevant interest groups than when it did not. 
The research design below gives more detail on our measure of effective support from legislative 
actors, which is based on the proportion of formal voting power held by legislative actors who 
VXSSRUWWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VSURSRVDODQGZKRDWWDFKDKLJKOHYHORIVDOLHQFHWRWKHLVVXHLQTXHVWLRQ 
The argument in relation to informal agenda-setting power refers to policy 
entrepreneurship, and a range of sources of power relevant to informal negotiations. The 
argument here is not about how the executive adjusts the contents of its policy proposals in 
response to the policy preferences of legislators, as is the case with formal agenda-setting power. 
Rather, it is that the executive has greater bargaining success despite a given level of resistance 
from other actors when it consulted than when it did not consult. Of course, bargaining success is 
QRW DQ LQGLFDWLRQ RI SRZHU LI WKH ³VXFFHVVIXO´ H[HFXWLYe has simply adapted its proposal to 
anticipate a compromise among legislators. Our analyses therefore control for the level of 
effective support for the H[HFXWLYH¶V proposals when examining the effect of consultations. If 
consultations improve the executiYH¶V EDUJDLQLQJ VXFFHVV E\ LQFUHDVLQJ LWV LQIRUPDO DJHQGD-
setting power, we would expect to find evidence for the following hypothesis: 
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H2: Even after controlling for the level of effective support from legislative actors, the executive 
has more bargaining success relative to legislative actors when it previously consulted with 
relevant interest groups than when it did not. 
 We now turn to how these expectations apply to consultations with interest groups in the 
European Union. In doing so, we also identify some additional variables for which we control in 
the analyses. 
 
Consultations in the European Union 
We examine whether the Commission has more bargaining success relative to the legislative 
actors during the decision-making stage when it consulted on its proposals during the prior 
policy formation stage. The Council of the EU, in which member states are represented, and the 
directly elected European Parliament (EP)DUHWKH(8¶VOHJLVODWLYHDFWRUV,QPRVWRIWKHFDVHV
we examine, the Council and EP share co-decision power, as is now usually the case under the 
ordinary legislative procedure. 
The EU is an appropriate testing ground for several reasons. First, there is considerable 
variation in whether or not and the ways in which the Commission consults with affected 
stakeholders when formulating legislative proposals. This variation provides an opportunity to 
compare cases with different levels and forms of consultation. Second, information on 
consultations has become increasingly available for research purposes. Third, we have a 
considerable amount of detailed information on the policy positions of the Commission and each 
of the main legislative actors, as well as decision outcomes, for a sample of legislative proposals 
in the form of the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al. 2012). Using this dataset we identify whether 
and the extent to which WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVwere congruent with the contents 
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of the laws that were subsequently adopted. We are also able to control for the degree of support 
the Commission received from each of the legislative actors. This allows us to draw inferences 
about whether the (8¶Vexecutive was in a stronger position relative to legislative actors after it 
held consultations. 
Consultations are a long-established practice in EU policymaking, but the relevant rules 
and principles were not formalized until 2001 (EC 2001). According to the Commission, 
consultations should be held on legislative proposals that require an extended impact assessment, 
which is required for proposals that ³UHVXOWLQVXEVWDQWLDOHFRQRPLFHQYLURQPHQWDODQGRUVRFLal 
LPSDFWRQDVSHFLILFVHFWRU´ (&7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQVFDQWDNHDYDULHW\
RI IRUPV LQFOXGLQJ FORVHG RU ³WDUJHWHG´ FRQVXOWDWLRQV ZLWK FDUHIXOO\ FKRVHQ VWDNHKROGHUV WKat 
have particularly relevant interests or areas of expertise, and open consultations in which the 
Commission announces a general consultation call to which any stakeholder or individual can 
respond online. The two formats of consultation are not mutually exclusive and are often used 
together. We identified 1,177 open consultations across all policy areas between 2001 and 2013.
1
  
The Commission has considerable discretion on whether to hold consultations and the 
form they take. These decisions are taken within each Directorate General (DG), the main 
organizational units within the Commission. The official guidelines only require the inclusion of 
³WDUJHWHG JURXSV´ LQ WKH FRQVXOWDWLRQV ZKLOH HQVXULQJ ³DGHTXDWH DZDUHQHVV-UDLVLQJ SXEOLFLW\´
(EC 2002: 20). A higKO\SODFHGSROLF\RIILFHULQWKH&RPPLVVLRQFRQILUPHGWKLVVLWXDWLRQ³It is 
up to the Commission service that is responsible for the preparation of the proposal to decide 
ZKDWWKHEHVWFRQVXOWDWLRQVWUDWHJ\IRUWKDWSURSRVDOLV´2 
As an example, consider the consultation held by the Commission prior to the 
introduction of the legislative proposal for a regulation setting emission performance standards 
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for new passenger cars as part of the (8¶VLQWHJUDWHGDSSURDFKWRUHGXFLQJ CO2 emissions from 
light-duty vehicles (COD/2007/297). This is one of the 54 legislative proposals included in our 
analyses and it represented an important development in the EU environmental policy. The 
Commission organized an online consultation between February and July 2007. When issuing its 
call for responses, the Commission identified a set of specific issues on which it sought 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶YLHZV. These consisted of detailed issues, such as measures to be taken to ensure 
that the proposed target of 120g/km for the reduction of CO2 emissions is reached, the time frame 
for reaching the targets, and whether to include commercial vans in the regulation. A total of 45 
interest groups participated in this online consultation. Two broad advocacy coalitions emerged 
during this consultation: organizations representing the European car manufacturing industry and 
those representing environmental NGOs. This consultation, like others, provided the 
Commission with a wealth of information on the support for different policies, as well as 
stakeholdHUV¶YLHZVRQWKHOLNHO\HIIHFWVRIGLIIHUHQWSROLF\RSWLRQV 
2XU IRFXV RQ WKH HIIHFWV RI VXFK FRQVXOWDWLRQV RQ WKH (XURSHDQ H[HFXWLYH¶V EDUJDLQLQJ
success during the subsequent decision-making stage is distinct from and complements existing 
research on consultations in the EU. Existing research focuses mainly on the inputs into these 
consultations, including the balance of interests that participate. These studies highlight the 
importance of consultations in the EU as part of the European-level system of interest 
intermediation and representation (e.g. Quittkat 2011; Rasmussen and Alexandrova 2012; 
Rasmussen and Caroll 2014). Despite the lack of systematic comparative research on the effects 
of consultations on policy outputs, existing research on EU lobbying suggests that consultations 
matter in this respect. Resource exchange theory posits that during interactions between interest 
groups and policymakers, groups are granted access, voice and policy influence, while the 
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Commission receives expert knowledge and input legitimacy (Bouwen 2004; Kohler-Koch and 
Finke 2007: 206-211; Coen 2009: 152). The first part of the exchange, in which stakeholders 
receive access, voice and legitimacy, is relatively well documented by scholarship on EU interest 
groups (Bouwen 2002, Coen 2009, Dür and Mateo 2012, Coen and Katsaitis 2013). However, 
little is known about the second part, which refers to whether the Commission actually benefits 
from its extensive consultations with stakeholders. 
The theoretical propositions formulated in the last section are readily applicable to the 
(XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V FRQVXOWDWLRQV 7R PDNH HIIHFWLYH XVH RI LWV IRUPDO DJHQGD-setting 
power, the Commission needs accurate information on the policy positions of the main 
legislative actors: the Council and the EP. Consultations with stakeholders including interest 
groups are a potential source of such information, since legislative actors formulate their policy 
positions at least partly in response to demands expressed by those stakeholders. Many interest 
groups that participate in EU-level consultations are powerful at the domestic level and shape the 
positions taken by their national governments. Liberal theory leads us to expect that the balance 
RI GRPHVWLF LQWHUHVWV VKDSH VWDWHV¶ SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV Moravcsik 1997: 518). The EP is also an 
important venue for interest group lobbying. Therefore, when the Commission consults with 
stakeholders during the formulation of its legislative proposals, it can formulate these proposals 
using information on legislDWLYH DFWRUV¶ SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV WKDW LV DV DFFXUDWH DV SRVVLEOH This 
would lead us to expect evidence for the first hypothesis, which implies that consultations lead to 
a closer alignment of WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\SURSRVDOV on the one hand, and member states and 
the EP¶s policy preferences on the other.3 
Informal agenda-setting power is particularly relevant to the EU given the importance of 
informal governance in legislative decision-making (Christiansen et al. 2003; Héritier 2012; Reh 
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et al. 2013). There is broad agreement that the Commission frequently acts as a policy 
entrepreneur (Mazey and Richardson 2006; Majone 1996: 74; Pollack 1997; Radaelli 2000: 26). 
&RQVXOWDWLRQV DUH UHOHYDQW WR DOO WKUHH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI DQ DJHQGD VHWWHU¶V HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS
5HJDUGLQJ WKH ILUVW FKDUDFWHULVWLF WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V³FODLP WRDKHDULQJ´FRQVXOWDWLRQVHQDEOH
the European executive to present itself as the voice of stakeholders affected by the legislative 
initiative. Following consultations, the Commission can claim more legitimacy for the policy 
positions it takes during the decision-making stage. Moreover, consultations provide expert 
knowledge and therefore enable the Commission to claim that its positions are likely to be 
effective in the sense that they will be complied with and bring about their intended results 
(Crombez 2002). Consultations also strengthen the Commission in terms of the second 
characteristic of policy entrepreneurship, the ability to negotiate skillfully. They give the 
Commission access to policy-relevant expertise on the effects of alternative policies, which 
provides it with an information advantage and technocratic legitimacy (Radaelli 2000: 27). 
Through consultations, the Commission may also accentuate the third characteristic of policy 
entrepreneurship identified by Kingdon: persistence. Commission officials view themselves as 
³FXVWRGLDQV´RI WKHFROOHFWLYH(XURSHDQ LQWHUHVW (OOLQDVDQG6XOHPDQ&RQVXOWDWLRQVDUH
part of a self-legitimization process that is common to all bureaucratic organizations. Having 
consulted widely with expert groups and affected interests during the policy formation stage, 
Commission officials perceive themselves to be entitled to pursue their policy proposals 
vigorously. This would lead us to expect evidence for the second hypothesis, which implies a 
SRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIFRQVXOWDWLRQVRQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVVHYHQDIWHUFRQWUROOLQJ
IRUWKHOHYHORIVXSSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOVIURPOHJLVODWLYHDFWRUV 
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 The following analyses also consider several additional characteristics of consultations 
and proposals that may be relevant, some of which are specific to the EU. First, we control for 
different types of consultations. Existing research on EU consultations notes the distinction 
between open, usually online consultations, and more restricted, closed consultations with 
selected groups, such as expert committees or high level groups (Mazey and Richardson 2006: 
250). We also distinguish among open consultations in terms of their scale and diversity. As 
detailed below, larger consultations tend to be more diverse in terms of the types of stakeholders 
involved and the range of member states from which they originate. Larger consultations may be 
PRUHHIIHFWLYHLQVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFODLPthat it consulted widely and obtained a 
breadth of relevant policy information. Second, we compare cases in terms of their information 
intensity, which refers to the level of specialist technical expertise required to participate in 
policymaking (Bendor et al. 2001: 242). Such expertise is often cited as a source of interest 
JURXSV¶LQIOXHQFHDQGLVWKHUHIRUHUHOHYDQWWRLQFOXGH)LQDOO\as part of the robustness tests the 
analyses also consider the type of EU legal instrument and legislative procedure used. 
   
Research design 
The following analyses focus on 151 controversial issues raised by 54 legislative proposals that 
were first discussed in the Council after the 2004 enlargement. These proposals were initially 
selected as part of the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). From the 125 proposals 
included in the DEUII dataset, we study the 54 that were first discussed after the 2004 
enlargement, which means that we include only proposals that were introduced after the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VQHZDSSURDFKWRFRQVultations started in 2001. 
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 In a series of semi-structured interviews with key informants, each controversial issue 
that featured in the discussions at the decision-making stage was reconstructed spatially. A total 
of 232 semi-structured interviews were held on the post-2004 part of the DEU project on which 
the present analysis is based. The interviewees were mainly officials from the permanent 
representations of the member states and from the Commission, who were involved in the 
decision-making on the cases selected. These interviews lasted an average of 65 minutes. During 
these interviews, key informants provided information on the issues that were controversial, the 
policy positions most favored by each of the relevant decision makers, and the levels of 
importance each actor attached to each issue. Each controversial issue was represented as a 
policy scale, with the numbers 0 and 100 at the endpoints of each scale representing the most 
extreme positions considered in relation to each issue. Key informants identified the policy 
positions most favored by each of the legislative actors and the Commission at the time of the 
introduction of the legislative proposal. Informants also estimated the level of salience each actor 
attached to each issue, again on a scale from 0 to 100. Detailed discussions of this approach 
appear in several existing publications (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). Two previous publications 
WHVWHGWKHUHOLDELOLW\DQGYDOLGLW\RIWKHNH\LQIRUPDQWV¶MXGJPHQWVXVHGLQWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\ZLWK
satisfactory results (Thomson et al. 2006: 329-47; König et al. 2007). These tests consisted of 
comparing key informants¶ judgments with information from documentation and comparing key 
informants¶ judgments with each other. For instance, König et al. (2007: 294) examined the point 
location of thirty-nine policy positions from seven of the issues included in the present study that 
were the subject of negotiation between the Council and the EP in conciliation committees. They 
compared the estimates of the key informants used for the present study with estimates from 
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informants in the EP: either rapporteurs or their legislative assistants. They found that thirty-five 
of the thirty-nine estimates matched perfectly or almost perfectly.  
Table 1 illustrates the data we use with two issues raised by the proposed regulation on 
the reduction of CO2 emissions of passenger cars (COD/2007/297). This proposal followed the 
consultations mentioned above, and these particular issues also featured in the prior consultation 
stage. The first issue concerns the parameter that should be used to decide which cars would be 
covered by the regulation. Two main policy positions were expressed on this issue: position 0 
indicates that vehicle mass (weight) should be used as a parameter, while position 100 indicates 
that the vehicle footprint should be used instead. While the vehicle mass was generally 
considered to have benefited the industries producing heavier cars that pollute more, vehicle 
footprint was considered to benefit producers of lighter vehicles that pollute less. Countries 
producing heavier automobiles such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and 
Romania have adopted the vehicle mass position, which was also expressed by the European 
Commission. This was also the policy option having the broadest support among interest groups 
participating in the open consultation. Countries opting for the vehicle footprint as a utility 
parameter were those countries that either had a well-developed light-weight vehicle industry or 
were supporters of the more environmental friendly option. The EP also supported this more 
environmentally friendly option. The outcome of the Council decision-making process favored 
the option supported by the Commission and the supporters of mass as a utility parameter. While 
this case is consistent with our expectation that the Commission has more bargaining success 
when it consulted, the following analyses examine whether this holds across a broad range of 
issues. 
[Table 1] 
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Analysis 
Before testing our hypotheses, we examine the type, occurrence and scope of the consultations 
that were held on our selected cases. In line with previous research we distinguish between 
closed and open consultations (Quittkat 2011: 658; Greenwood 2007); we identified this 
information in the explanatory memorandum in each legislative proposal (which was released 
after the consultations). The Commission held some form of consultation, either closed, open or 
both in the majority of cases: in 38 of the 54 legislative proposals selected for study, which 
included 113 of the 151 controversial issues raised. Closed consultations were somewhat more 
frequent than open consultations, although the Commission often held both closed and open 
consultations. The Commission held closed consultations without holding open consultations on 
13 proposals (with 39 issues), open consultations without closed consultations on 8 proposals 
(with 23 issues) and both types on 17 proposals (with 51 issues). This gives us a reasonable 
number of observations with which to distinguish the effects of different types of consultations 
RQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV 
The legislative proposals on which the Commission held consultations have a higher 
level of information intensity or complexity than proposals on which it did not consult. We 
measured information intensity by the number of recitals in the legislative proposal. Recitals 
precede the main body of the proposal and state the principles and assumptions on which the 
legislation is based, and often refer to other laws to which the present one relates. Similarly, 
Kaeding (2006: 236) used the number of recitals to measure the amount of detail in laws. The 
proposals on which the Commission consulted had an average of 29.88 recitals (s.d. 18.38; 
n=38), while the proposals on which the Commission did not consult had an average of 19.19 
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recitals (s.d. 18.31; n=16; p=.01 from the rank test). There is also a significant difference in the 
same direction between the proposals on which the Commission held open consultations and 
those on which it did not. There is also a difference in the same direction, although not a 
significant one, between proposals on which the Commission held closed consultations and those 
on which it did not. The theoretical relevance of this finding is that it suggests the Commission 
consults with interest groups to take advantage of their specialist technical expertise, which is 
particularly valuable in relation to proposals with a high level of information intensity. This 
finding also means that information intensity should be included as a control variable in analyses 
RIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRQVXOWDWLRQVRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV  
Open consultations vary considerably in terms of the numbers of stakeholders that 
participated. The numbers of stakeholders are highly correlated with the diversity of stakeholders 
in terms of stakeholder type and country of origin. )URPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZHEVLWH and through 
written requests to Commission services, we gathHUHGLQIRUPDWLRQRQSDUWLFLSDWLQJVWDNHKROGHUV¶
characteristics, specifically: (1) the total number of groups that participated; (2) the number of 
public and private interest groups consulted;
4
 DQG  HDFK JURXS¶V FRXQWU\ RI RULJLQ LI DQ\
While we were able to obtain information on the numbers of interest groups that participated in 
24 of the 25 open consultations selected for study, we could obtain detailed information on the 
type of groups consulted on 20 of the consultations and on the origin of the groups in 16 of the 
consultations. The total number of groups is highly correlated with both the number of public 
interest groups and private interest groups; the Spearman rho correlations are .58 (p<.01; n=20) 
and .72 (p<.01; n=20) respectively. Similarly, the total number of groups consulted is highly 
correlated with the diversity of groups in terms of their country of origin. We constructed a 
measure of the number of member states included in the countries of origin of the participating 
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groups. The total number of groups is highly correlated with this PHDVXUHRIJURXSV¶ breadth of 
origin (Spearman rho correlation .86; n=16; p<.01). Given these very high correlations and our 
desire to include as many observations as possible, we focus on the number of groups that 
participated as a proxy for both the scale and diversity of open consultations. 
The number of stakeholders that participated in the consultations is highly skewed. 
Across the 24 proposals on which we have information on the numbers of groups that 
participated, the smallest number is 4 and the largest number is 1,246 (average 174.42; s.d. 
254.47). We transformed this variable into a categorical indicator and use that as an independent 
YDULDEOH LQ WKHDQDO\VLVRI WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV LQ the following section. This 
variable distinguishes among small open consultations involving between 1 and 50 groups (7 
proposals with 25 issues), medium sized consultations involving 51 to 150 groups (9 proposals 
with 22 issues) and large consultations with over 150 groups (8 proposals with 23 issues). To 
ensure that the results are not driven by such coding decisions, we also applied a log 
transformation of the number of groups as one of several robustness tests and obtained 
substantively the same results. 
Turning now to the first of our two hypotheses, we H[DPLQHZKHWKHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
consultations were followed by proposals that had more support from legislative actors. We 
constructed a measure of HIIHFWLYHVXSSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\proposal as follows.5 
voting powera  saliencea
{ position a = position Commission}
å
voting powera  saliencea
a=1
n
å
´100
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ZKHUHWKHDFWRUVIURPWKHGHFLVLRQVWDJHDUHGHQRWHGDEF«IURPWKHVHWQDQGFRQVLVWRIWKH
Commission, each of the member states in the Council, and the European Parliament.  
positiona is the policy position of actor a on the issue. 
voting powera is the voting power of actor i RQ WKH LVVXH ,Q WKLV DSSOLFDWLRQ ZH XVH DFWRUV¶
Shapley-Shubik Power Index scores, which assigns a weight to each actor based on the 
legislative procedures.
6
 
saliencea is the level of salience that actor a attaches to the issue.  
This measure of effective support is the effective voting power (voting power times salience) that 
VXSSRUWVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIDOOHIIHFWLYHYRWLQJSRZHURQWKHLVVXHLQ
question. It incorporates information on the positioning of the Commission relative to other 
actors, its relative salience for the issue, and the legislative procedure.  
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the cases on which the Commission consulted stakeholders do 
not differ significantly from those on which it did not consult in terms of effective support. 
Effective support was on average of 38.39 percent for issues from proposals on which the 
Commission consulted (s.d. 24.68; n=38 issues), compared to 37.19 percent (s.d. 23.93; n=113) 
for issues from proposals on which it did consult (p=.94 from the rank test). Similarly, there are 
QRVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHOHYHORIHIIHFWLYHVXSSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOVE\WKH
type of consultation it held. The theoretical significance of this non-finding is that there is no 
evidence that consultations empower the Commission by bolstering its formal agenda-setting 
power. 1RQHWKHOHVV ZH H[SHFW HIIHFWLYH VXSSRUW IRU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SURSRVDOV WR DIIHFW
whether its positions are adopted as laws, and therefore control for effective support in the 
IROORZLQJDQDO\VLVLQZKLFKZHH[DPLQHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV 
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The &RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVVLV defined as the level of congruence between the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V SROLF\ SRVLWLRQ RQ HDFK LVVXH DQG WKH Gecision outcome adopted in the final 
OHJLVODWLYH DFW:H IRFXV ILUVW RQ DGLFKRWRPRXVPHDVXUHRI WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V VXFFHVV ZKLFK
identifies ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SROLF\ SRVLWLRQ FRUUHVSRQGHG WR WKH GHFLVLRQ
outcome. The advantage of this dichotomous measure is that it does not involve the comparison 
of the distances across the policy scales, which refer to substantively different issues. Table 2 
VKRZVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXFFHVVUDWHwas significantly higher when it consulted openly than 
when it did not: 27 percent compared to 14 percent (p=.05). 7KHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
success rate is only significant for cases in which open consultations were held compared to 
other cases. The difference is not significant for closed consultations, or for open and closed 
consultations combined.  
The finding from Table 2 DOVR KROGV IRU D FRQWLQXRXV PHDVXUH RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
bargaining success: WKHDEVROXWHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDODQG WKHGHFLVLRQ
outcome on each policy scale. This continuous measure of Commission success was on average 
34.99 (s.d. 32.61) on the 74 issues on which it consulted openly, compared to 45.70 (s.d. 33.86) 
on the 77 issues on which it did not consult openly (p=.05 from the rank test). The following 
analyses confirm the importance of open consultations with multivariate models that also control 
IRUHIIHFWLYHVXSSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOVIURPRWKHUOHJLVODWLYHDFWRUV as well as the 
information intensity of each dossier. 
[Table 2] 
Model 1 in Table 3 is a logit model that uses the dichotomous measure of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV$JDLQWKHPDLQILQGLQJLVWKDWRSHQFRQVXOWDWLRQVLQFUHDVHWKH
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V EDUJDLQLQJ VXFFHVV /DUJH FRQVXOWDWLRQV LQ SDUWLFXODU KDYH D PDUNHG SRVLWLYH
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effect. The exponentiated coefficient associated with large consultations (involving more than 
151 groups) is 6.45, indicating that the odds of Commission success are more than six times 
greater if the Commission held such large open consultations than if it did not consult openly. 
The effect of large consultations can also be expressed as a predicted probability, holding the 
other variables constant.
7
 When open consultations are not held, the predicted probability of 
Commission success is .11 (95 percent confidence interval (95% CI): .02; .19). When open 
consultations involving more than 150 groups are held, the predicted probability of Commission 
success increases to .44 (95% CI: .27; .61). Small open consultations involving up to 50 groups 
are also associated with significantly more success for the Commission, but the effect is weaker. 
Overall, the effect of holding open consultations has a positive and significant effect on the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV 
[Table 3] 
Model 1 also contains several other variables. Closed consultations do not have a 
VLJQLILFDQW HIIHFWRQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV$VH[SHFWHG ³HIIHFWLYHVXSSRUW IRU
WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV´ has a large positive effect. Every one-point increase in 
effective support raises the odds of Commission success by four percent. Effective support has 
an average of 37.95 percent (s.d. 24.01). Moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the average effective support increases the predicted probability of 
Commission success from .05 (95% CI: .00; .10) to .23 (95% CI: .08; .37). Viewed in terms of 
predicted probabilities, the size of this effect is smaller than that of holding large open 
consultations. Recall that effective support includes a large amount of information: the location 
RIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\SRVLWLRQVUHODWLYHWRWKRVHRIRWKHUDFWRUVWKHVDOLHQFHRIHDFKLVVXH
to each of the actors, and the relative voting power of each of the actors. The fact that holding 
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large consultations has a greater impact than this control variable implies that it is substantively 
very important. The information intensity of the legislative proposal, measured by the numbers 
of recitals, is also included as a control variable, and is insignificant. 
We conducted a range of tests to check the robustness of our main finding regarding the 
SRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIODUJHRSHQFRQVXOWDWLRQVRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV)LUst, we ran 
the same model with the continuous measure of the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V EDUJDLQLQJ VXFFHVV. We 
analyzed this dependent variable with a Tobit model and the results are reported in Model 2 of 
Table 3. The Tobit model takes into account the bounded nature of this variable; by definition, it 
cannot be lower than zero or greater than 100. The findings mirror almost exactly those of the 
logit model. The coefficient of -38.49 associated with the large open consultations variable 
indicates that when these take place, decision outcomes are on average 38.49 adjusted policy 
VFDOHSRLQWVFORVHU WR WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\SURSosals. In a second robustness test we reran 
Model 1 of Table 3 using King DQG=HQJ¶VORJLVWLFUHJUHVVLRQHVWLPDWRU, which adjusts the 
standard errors for the biases that can result from rare events and small sample sizes, the latter of 
which applies to our study. The results were the same. In a third set of robustness tests, we ran 
the models in Table 3 with a log transformation of the number of groups involved in open 
consultations as an alternative to the three-group categorization. This log-transformed variable 
also had a significant and SRVLWLYH HIIHFW RQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V EDUJDLQLQJ VXFFHVV ZKLFK
indicates that our results are not driven by our particular coding decisions.
8
 In a fourth set of 
robustness tests, we ran the models in Table 3 with additional controls, consisting of the 
legislative procedure used and the type of legal instrument. Neither of these additional control 
variables was significant, and they did not alter the findings. Recall that our effective support 
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variable already includes information on the legislative procedure. We present the models that 
include only those variables that are in our view theoretically compelling. 
 
Conclusions 
We argued and found WKDWWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWKDIIHFWHGLQWHUHVWVSDUWLFXODUO\RSHn 
consultations that are large and diverse, strengthen its bargaining success relative to legislative 
actors. We developed the DUJXPHQWE\GLVFXVVLQJH[HFXWLYHV¶IRUPDODQGLQIRUPDODJHQGD-setting 
power. Formal agenda-setting power consists of the executive using the legislative procedure and 
LWV NQRZOHGJH RI OHJLVODWRUV¶ SROLF\ SUHIHUHQFHV to bring about decision outcomes that are as 
close as possible to its own policy preferences. According to this mechanism, the executive uses 
its right of initiative, in combination with information on amendment rules, the policy 
preferences of legislators, and the reversion point, to pitch its policy proposals optimally, so that 
decision outcomes are as close as possible to its preference. Models of formal agenda-setting 
power assume that executive agenda setters have full information on the policy preferences of 
legislative actors, with which agenda setters locate pivotal legislators (Romer and Rosenthal 
1978; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). We argued that information on legLVODWRUV¶SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHV
is not always readily available to the executive, and that consultations are a means of obtaining 
such information. An implication of this argument is that the location of the e[HFXWLYH¶V
legislative proposal relative to the policy preferences of legislative actors differs between 
proposals on which the executive consulted interest groups and proposals on which it did not. 
However, the evidence did not reveal any difference in the levels of effective support for the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V proposals on cases on which it consulted and cases on which it did not consult. 
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This suggests that formal agenda-setting power is not the main mechanism through which 
consultations empower the European executive. 
 Informal agenda-setting power is equally important in our argument (Pollack 1997: 121; 
Moravcsik 1999). Informal agenda-setting power refers to the impact of consultations on the 
H[HFXWLYH¶V ability to influence legislators (Kingdon 1984: 180-1). This ability is strengthened by 
the legitimacy the executive receives from consulting with affected interests and incorporating 
policy-relevant expertise (Mörth 2009). In line with this argument, the evidence shows that even 
after controlling for the level of effective support by legislators for the CommiVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOV
the Commission has more bargaining success when it consulted widely. This implies that 
consultations are not only associated with more bargaining success, but more bargaining success 
in the face of resistance from legislative actors. In other words, large consultations bolster the 
bargaining power of the Commission. Future research should attempt to disentangle the detailed 
PHFKDQLVPV WKURXJKZKLFKRSHQFRQVXOWDWLRQV LQFUHDVH WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU LQ
the decision stage. Our findings suggest that these mechanisms lie mainly in the realm of 
informal bargaining. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Controversial issues raised by the regulation of CO2 emissions of passenger cars (Decision-
making stage). 
Issue 1: What should define whether a car is covered in the regulation? (car parameters) 
Position 0: Vehicle mass (outcome) COM AT CZ DE PL RO SK ES 
Position 100: Vehicle footprint EP BE DK FI FR EL IE IT LU NL SI  
 
Issue 2: What level of penalties should be imposed for excess emissions? 
Position 0: Low COM AT BE BU CY DK EE FI EL HU IE LV IT LU MT NL 
PT RO SI SE UK 
Position 60: Graduated (Outcome)  
Position 100: High EP CZ FR DE IT PL SK ES 
Note: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: 
France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: 
Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; 
SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom; COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament. Not all MSs took a policy 
position on these issues. 
 
 
 
Table 2. The Commission has greater bargaining success when it consults openly 
 Type of consultation  
Decision outcomes in line with the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\SRVLWLRQV" 
None or 
closed only 
Open Total 
No 86% (66) 73% (54) 79% (120) 
Yes 14% (11) 27% (20) 21% (31) 
Total 100% (77) 100% (74) 100% (151) 
NB: Frequencies in parentheses. Chi2 3.75; p=.05. 
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Table 3. The effects of prior consultations on the &RPPLVVLRQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJVXFFHVV 
 Model 1 
Logit 
 Model 2 
Tobit 
 
 Exp(b) (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p 
Closed consultations 1.24 (.49) .59 2.57 (8.29) .76 
Number of groups consulted in open consultations 
(reference group: no open consultation) 
    
   1-50 5.31 (3.26) .01 -24.71 (11.56) .03 
   51-150 .73 (.59) .78 -2.71 (11.07) .81 
   >150 6.45 (3.38) .00 -38.49 (8.68) .00 
(IIHFWLYHVXSSRUWIRU&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSosition 1.04 (.01) .00 -.43 (.13) .00 
Information intensity .99 (.02) .51 .22 (.21) .29 
Constant .03 (.03) .00 55.89 (8.92) .00 
Log pseudolikelihood -62.31  -558.28  
Model 1 Wald chi2 (p) / Model 2 F (p) 22.34 (.00)  5.35 (.00)  
n issues (proposals) 147 (53)  147 (53)  
Note: The dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous measure of whether the decision 
RXWFRPH LV WKH VDPH DV  RU GLIIHUHQW IURP  WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SROLF\ SRVLWLRQ The 
dependent variable in Model 2 is the absolute distance between the decision outcome and the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQ6WDQGDUGHUURUVFOXVWHUHGE\OHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOV 
 
 
 
31 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm and websites of EC Directorates-
General. 
2
 Correspondence with the European Commission, General Secretariat, July 15th, 2013. 
3
 A recent study of the duration of legislative decision-making in the EU by Rasmussen and Toshkov 
(2013) may suggest a different relationship between consultations and support for legislative proposals. 
They found that legislative proposals preceded by consultations took longer to adopt, indicating that the 
legislative decision-making stage was more controversial, than proposals that were not preceded by 
consultations. 
4
 We coded national agencies/ministries, local authorities, environmental and consumer NGOs as public 
interest groups, and business and professional (trade unions) organisations as private interest groups.  
5
 7KLVPHDVXUHUHVHPEOHVDFRPSRQHQWRI%XHQRGH0HVTXLWD¶VH[SHFWHGXWLOLW\PRGHO 
6
 We follow Thomson et al. (2006: 49) by defining the winning coalitions for the Shapley Shubik Index as 
follows. For legislative proposals subject to the codecision procedure with qualified majority voting in the 
Council, winning coalitions consist of a qualified majority of member states and the EP. For those subject 
to consultation and qualified majority voting, there are two types of winning coalitions: the first consists 
of a qualified majority of member states and the Commission, while the second consists of all member 
states. For proposals subject to consultation and unanimity, the winning coalition includes all member 
states. In this latter case, the Commission is never pivotal and has a formal voting power of zero. 
7
 7KLV PHDQV VHWWLQJ WKH YDULDEOHV ³FORVHG FRQVXOWDWLRQ´ WR LWV PRGH RI  ³HIIHFWLYH VXSSRUW IRU WKH
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQ´WRLWVPHDQRISHUFHQWDQGWKHQXPEHr of recitals to 27.41. 
8
 The log transformed variable is the natural log of x+1, where x is the number of groups consulted in an 
open consultation. The addition of 1 means that we obtain a value for the cases in which no groups were 
consulted and also that we avoid using the part of the natural log function between 0 and 1 that increases 
very sharply. In line with the results presented, this log transformed variable was associated with a 
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significant (p=.01) positive effect in the logit model (Model 1 of Table 3) and a significant (p<.01) 
negative effect in the Tobit model (Model 2 of Table 3). 
